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NOTES AND COMMENT
under or through the mortgagor, until the lien is foreclosed.
Foreclosure of the lien does not take place upon the com-
mencement of a foreclosure action, but upon a sale under a
judgment of foreclosure. Though, during the pendency of
the action, a court of equity has power to issue interlocutory
orders for the protection of an asserted lien, such orders
must be auxiliary to the right to foreclose the lien, and can-
not deprive any party of a title or a right, which though sub-
ordinate to the lien of the mortgage, survive and are valid
until the lien is foreclosed by a sale under a judgment of
foreclosure."
It would seem, in view of this decision, that tenants in posses-
sion of premises under foreclosure are similarly situated until a
sale therein, whether the lease be prior or subsequent to the mort-
gage; or, if the latter, whether or not they have been made parties
to the action. The rule has been uniform where the lease is prior
to the mortgage, viz.: the lessee is protected where advance pay-
ments have been made in good faith, and is liable for rent accruing
after the appointment of a receiver or then remaining unpaid.25
In light of the Child's case, the decision is unquestionably sound
in theory and affords a more tenable position to the lessee. It is
true that circumstances will arise wherein the mortgagee, through
unavoidable delay in bringing the action to judgment and sale, will
be deprived of a substantial measure of security. Such a situation
does not justify the broad power of interference heretofore exercised.
How far the rule will be extended is not here conjectured. It
should not, however, be seized upon to limit the remedies of the
mortgagee, by application to cases beyond its purport.26
JOSEPHi F. KELLY.
FINANCIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AS GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE CONTRACT.
The plaintiff, who had been keeping company with the defen-
dant for some time, in reply to her constant importunings for mar-
'Isaacs v. Greenberg, 145 N. Y. Supp. 921 (1914).
'That the law in regard to the payment of rent during foreclosure
proceedings has not been entirely settled by the decision in the Prudence
case is evident from a reading of the decision in the case of Holmes v. Graven-
horst, decided by Steinbrink, J., at Special Term, Kings County, under date of
March 11, 1933, reported in Vol. 89 N. Y. L. J. at 1448. In that case the
learned judge held that the decision in the Prudence case swept away completely
the right of a court of equity to fix the occupational rent of premises pending
the foreclosure proceedings tenanted by the owner of the fee.
The writer feels that the Court of Appeals in its decision in the Prudence
case in no way intimated that it intended to do away with the power of a court
of equity to fix the fair and reasonable value of premises occupied by the owner
of the fee pending a foreclosure. It seems from a study of the Court of
Appeals decision that no basis for such an inference can be there found.
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riage, stated that while he was not unwilling, he was unable to marry
her due to his lack of means to support a wife. The defendant
offered to help him with money when the opportunity came. With
the arrival of a business opportunity, the defendant promised to
give the plaintiff the needed money, some $6,000, after the wedding.
The marriage over, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant did
not have, and never possessed, the promised money. Plaintiff ac-
cordingly brought an action to have the marriage annulled. The
Referee and the Appellate Division,' by a three to two decision,
refused a decree on the ground that the misrepresentation was not
as to a "material" fact. The Court of Appeals, 2 in a four to three
decision, reversed the decree, finding the misrepresentation suffi-
ciently material to warrant the annulment of the marriage.
"Marriage, go far as its validity is concerned, continues to be
a civil contract, to which the consent of the parties capable in law
of making a contract is essential." 3 So it was, too, before the
statute was enacted.4  The essentials of marriage, as a civil con-
tract, are therefore, (a) consent by (b) parties having statutory
capacity to give it. Any lack in those essentials makes the marriage
void 5 or. voidable. 6 If either party consents by reason of fraud.
there is, in reality, no consent. Hence, the marriage is voidable,7
and an action may be maintained to annul it. While the jurisdic-
tion of the court to annul is purely statutory,8 it is, nevertheless,
equitable in its nature ;9 particularly, where fraud is charged. 10 The
statute is silent as to what constitutes fraud. The legislature, by
its silence, has adopted the discerning attitude of equity, which re-
fuses to delimit fraud, lest by so doing, it provide a refuge of safety
for the cunning, but reprehensible, just outside the definition."
Thus, the court is free to meet each case as it arises, and to apply
to the defendant's conduct the hoary, but righteous, test of fair
and conscientious dealing12  But fraud alone is of no avail unless
followed by the statutory consequence that consent to the marriage
1Shonfeld v. Shonfeld, 236 App. Div. 271, 258 N. Y. Supp. 338 (1st Dept.
1932).2260 N. Y. 477, 184 N. E. 60 (1933).
'DOMEsnc RELATIONS LAW; N. Y. CoNs. LAWS, C. 14, §10.
'Ferlat v. Gojon, 1 Hopkins Ch. 478 (N. Y. 1825).
Supra -note 3, §§5 and 6.
'Ibid. §7.
Ibid. subd. 4.
:Walter v. Walter, 217 N. Y. 439, 111 N. E. 1081 (1916).
'Cf. Bays v. Bays, 105 Misc. 492, 174 N. Y. Supp. 212 (1918).
20Supra note 2; Fiske v. Fiske, 6 App. Div. 432, 39 N. Y. Supp. 537 (1st
Dept. 1896). In the Fiske case the Court wrote: "The jurisdiction of the court
to annual a marriage on the ground of fraud is not acquired by the provision of
any statute. It arises from the inherent jurisdiction of a court of chancery to
set aside any contract when one of the parties was induced to enter into it by
fraud upon him."
I Supra note 2, at 479, N. E. at 61.
12 Ibid.
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was given by reason of it.13 What must be the nature of the fraud
to bring about the statutory result? It is, precisely, at this point
that the controversy arises. 14  Fundamentally, the dispute involves
a conflict of social philosophies. One line of decisions regards mar-
riage as something pre-eminently sacred, of the divine, sacrosanct-
a relationship that is not to be tampered with by mundane hands;
except in cases of extreme necessity. Another line of cases views
marriage as an earthly affair, a civil contract between two fallible
mortals, which contract may be voided by the party whose consent
was fraudulently procured, exactly as in an ordinary contract.
The outstanding authority proclaiming the first view is Fiske
v. Fiske,15 the inspirational source of all the later cases adopting
the same position. Here it was held that no ordinary fraud would
warrant the annulment of a marriage. The fraud must be as to a
matter which woula prevent the parties from entering into the mar-
riage relationship, or, having entered into such relationship, would
preclude them from performing the duties incident thereto. Fraud
that was immaterial could be disregarded, and no fraud was to be
deemed material unless it went "to the very essence of the con-
tract," that is, affected the marital relationship. Thes& views have
found ample support in New York.16 The law in England is sub-
stantially the same.1
7
The second view mentioned has its leading protagonist in the
case of Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorewzo.18 Here it was stated that under
" Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63 (1903) ; Svenson
v. Svenson, 178 N. Y. 54, 70 N. E. 120 (1904).
"Supra note 2, at 484, N. E. at 63.
Supra note 10. Here, the fraud claimed was the concealment of a prior
marriage and divorce by the defendant wife. At page 434 the Court wrote:
"* * * the fraud which will induce the court to set aside an ordinary contract
is something different from the fraud which will induce the court to set aside a
contract of marriage which has been executed, or even a contract which is still
executory * * * no fraud will avoid a marriage contract which does not go to
the very essence of the contract, and which is not in its nature such a thing as
would either prevent the party from entering into the marriage relation, or
having entered into it, would preclude the performance of the duties which the
law and custom imposes upon the husband or wife as a party to the contract.
* * * Within the rule it has been held that the fraudulent representations of one
party as to faith, social position, fortune, good health and temperament do not
vitiate the contract." And again, on page 435: "If when the relation is entered
into, the party is competent to make that contract, is mentally competent to do
the duties which the contract invokes, and physically able to meet its obligations,
nothing more is required; * * *."
"'Barker v. Barker, 88 Misc. 300, 151 N. Y. Supp. 811 (1914); Roth v.
Roth, 97 Misc. 136, 161 N. Y. Supp. 99 (1916) ; Beckermeister v. Beckermeister,
170 N. Y. Supp. 22 (1918) ; Price v. Tompkins, 171 N. Y. Supp. 844 (1918) ;
Price v. Tompkins, 108 Misc. 263, 177 N. Y. Supp. 548 (1919); Butler v.
Butler, 204 App. Div. 602, 198 N. Y. Supp. 391 (1st Dept. 1923).
' Fessenden, Nullity of Marriage (1899) 13 HARv. L. REv. 110; Notes
(1920) 34 HARv. L. lEv. 218.
IsSupra note 13. In this case, the plaintiff, who had been living in a
meretricious relationship with the defendant, left the state for some time; on
his return he married the defendant, being induced so to do by her fraudulent
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the statute,19 a contract to marry is a'civil contract, subject to the
rules of free consent in such contracts, and voidable in the event
of fraud. But it was held that not every fraud, by reason of which
the particular person may have given consent to the marriage, is
an adequate basis for annulment. Any fraud is adequate which is
"material to that degree that had it not been practiced, the party
deceived would not have consented to the marriage," 20 and is "of
such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person." 21 Noth-
ing was herein said about the necessity of the fraud going "to the
very essence of the contract" in order to be material. The crucial
inquiries are: Would the plaintiff's consent to marry have been
absent were it not for the misrepresentation? Did the plaintiff act
reasonably? If these questions are answered in the affirmative,, an
annulment must be granted regardless of the subject matter of the
fraud. The fraud under these circumstances destroys the vital and
life-giving element of a civil contract: the element of free consent.
The mandate of the law in such a case is clear.22  This view was
forcibly reiterated in Dornsche v. Do1scltw.
23
misrepresentation that he was the father of her child, but which child she had
in fact borrowed to enable her to beguile the plaintiff into marriage. The
marriage was annulled.
"Supra note 3.
Supra note 13, at 471, N. E. at 64.
Ibid. at 474, N. E. at 65. At page 472, N. E. at 64 the Court wrote:
"While it is true, that marriage contracts are fixed upon considerations peculiar
to themselves and that public policy is concerned with the regulation of the
family relation, nevertheless, our law considers marriage in no other light than
as a civil contract.
"The free and full consent which is the essence of all ordinary contracts,
is expressly made by the statute necessary to the validity of the marriage con-
tract. The minds of the parties must meet in one intention. It is a general rule
that every misrepresentation of a material fact, made with the intention to
induce the other party to enter into the contract and without which he would
not have done so, justifies the court in vacating the agreement. It is obvious
that no one would obligate himself by a contract, if he knew that a material
misrepresentation entering into the reason for his consent, was untrue. There is
no valid reason for exempting the marriage contract from the general rule."
Supra notes 3 and 7.
138 App. Div. 454, 122 N. Y. Supp. 892 (2d Dept. 1910). This
was an action to annul a marriage for fraud in that, prior to the mar-
riage, plaintiff's wife represented to him that she had been the wife of a
man then deceased, to whom her child was born, when in truth she had been
that man's mistress, and the child was a bastard. The marriage was annulled.
At page 456, the Court wrote: "It is quite true that such a representation is not
as to the essentialia of the marriage contract, for previous chastity is not a
necessary qualification for cohabitation or the full discharge of the duties of
consortium. But it seems to me that the question is whether such representation
may not be as to a fact material to the consent of the other party to make the
contract * * * [here quoting from the Di Lorenzo case, mtpra note 13] * * *
there we have the principle enunciated that the materiality goes to the consent
to the contract and need not strike at the capacity to perform it." Again, on
page 458: "I cannot perceive that the question is affected by the circumstance
that the marriage was consummated, for the sole relation of the false represen-
tation, as used by the law, is to the consent to the contract of marriage, and the
sole limitation is voluntary cohabitation subsequent to the full knowledge of
the facts."
NOTES AND COMMENT
The prevailing opinion of the Appellate Division 24 and the
dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals 25 in the Shonfeld case,
are based upon the "to the very essence of the contract" doctrine.
Both decisions, basically, are rooted in the philosophy of a section
from a work by Bishop,26 which frequently is cited with approval:
"In the contract of marriage, which forms the gateway to the mar-
riage status, the parties take each other for better, for worse, for
richer, for poorer, to cherish each other in sickness and in health;
consequently a mistake, whether resulting from accident, or in gen-
eral, from fraudulent practices, in respect to the character, fortune,
health, or the like, does not render void what is done." This sec-
tion is undoubtedly rhetorical; but it is in absolute variance with
the solid facts of life. It is unmitigated rigor, not law. If this
section were followed literally, no annulment could be granted when
one party represents himself as being in good health when as a mat-
ter of fact he is infected with syphilis,27 or is an incurable drug
addict,28 or where one party represents himself as a person of im-
peccable character when he is an ex-convict with many convictions
for felonies, 29 or is an active thief being hunted by the police
throughout the land.30 In every such case, the New York courts
have granted an annulment.31
Judge Crane, in his dissenting opinion,82 characterizes this mar-
riage as a mere matter of bargain and sale, and concludes that the
court should not annul the marriage merely because one of the
parties is disappointed in the material wealth of the other. He says:
"The question is whether the marriage ceremony in this state is of
any binding force or whether it is a mere empty ceremony." 33 The
learned judge strenuously objects to commercialism in marriage.
Perhaps it would be better if people married for love alone; but
the fact is they do not. Wealth and social position are very often
the predominant reasons for marriage. These are facts of life, and
the court should not bandage its eyes when dealing with intensely
human problems. Liberating parties when one spouse feels that
he cannot live with the other, will not weaken the institution of
marriage. But, on the other hand, there is a great probability that
marriage will become "a mere empty ceremony" when the court
refuses to annul a marriage where there is no possibility that the
~Supra note 1.
Z Supra note 2.no 1 BisHop, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (6th ed.) 167.
= Anonymous, 21 Misc. 765, 49 N. Y. Supp. 331 (1897); Svenson v.
Svenson, supra note 13.
3O'Connell v. O'Connell, 201 App. Div. 338, 194 N. Y. Supp. 265 (1st
Dept. 1922).
SHarris v. Harris, 201 App. Div. 880, 193 N. Y. Supp. 936 (1st Dept.
1922).
"'Keyes v. Keyes, 6 Misc. 355, 26 N. Y. Supp. 910 (1893).
tmSupra notes 27, 28, 29 and 30.
' Supra note 2.
Ibid. at 482, N. E. at 62.
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spouses will live together; and this because of an ante-nuptial fraud
through which consent to the marriage was procured.
The prevailing opinion in the Shonfeld case,34 once and for all
time, repudiates the "to the very essence of the contract" doctrine 35
as enunciated in the Fiske case. The Court approves the criterion
established in the Di Lorenzo case a6 for the determining of the
materiality of the fraud, and unequivocally accepts the doctrine in
that case to the effect that marriage is a civil contract and voidable
in the absence of free consent.37
When Judge Crouch, speaking for the majority, says: "* * *
no public policy demands that prudent consideration of ability to
fulfill the duty of support shall not have a legitimate place in the
determination by a party whether or not to marry," 38 we hear the
authentic voice of judicial realism.
JACOB SALZMAN.
NEGOTIABILITY OF CORPORATE BONDS.
There is a sharp diversity of opinion concerning the negotia-
bility of corporate bonds or notes issued under a collateral trust deed
or agreement, which bonds or notes contain on their face a reference
clause referring the holder to said trust deed or agreement for a
statement concerning the security posted, or the rights and liabilities
of the holder of said bonds or notes, or both.
The arguments pro and con center upon two theories: (1)
notice, (2) consistency. The federal rule is, that such a clause gives
a purchaser notice, actual or implied, of all the terms of the trust
deed or agreement, and a provision in such deed limiting or regu-
lating the method of enforcing the liability of the obligor on said
bond or notg is not inconsistent with the promise to pay therein
expressed. The New York rule is that the question of notice is
one dependent upon the wording of said clause and if a clause in
a trust deed affects in any way the promise to pay expressed in
the bond, such is inconsistent with said promise and must be
disregarded.
In the New York Law Journal, Feb. 8, 1933, Goldstein, J.,.
directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in an action based on a
bond of the defendant issued under and pursuant to a trust agree-
a' Supra note 2.
Ibid. at 479, N. E. at 61: "* ** the fraud need not necessarily concern
what is commonly called the essentials of the marriage relation: the rights and




Ibid. at 482, N. E. at 62.
